Opening out and closing down: the treatment of uncertainty in transport planning’s forecasting paradigm by Lyons, G & Marsden, G
Vol.:(0123456789)
Transportation
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11116-019-10067-x
1 3
Opening out and closing down: the treatment of uncertainty 
in transport planning’s forecasting paradigm
Glenn Lyons1  · Greg Marsden2 
 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Since the 1960s, development of the transport system has been framed by the notion of 
forecasting future demand. Yet the past decade or more appears to signal some signifi-
cant changes to the role of travel in society which are having a material impact on how 
much people travel (and may travel in the future). Coupled with the potential for major 
technological changes and a range of climate adaptation scenarios, the future of mobility 
presents today’s decision making on transport strategy and investment with a broader set 
of uncertainties than has previously been considered. This paper examines current main-
stream practice for incorporating uncertainty into decision-making, through an illustrative 
case study of the highly codified approaches of the Department for Transport in England. 
It deconstructs the issue by first focussing on different ways in which there is an open-
ing out or acceptance of new uncertainties and how this creates a (wider) set of potential 
futures. It then turns to consider how this set of futures is used, or not, in decision-making, 
i.e. the process of closing down uncertainty to arrive at or at least inform a decision. We 
demonstrate that, because the range of uncertainties has broadened in scope and scale, the 
traditional technocratic approach of closing down decisions through sensitivity testing is at 
odds with the greater breadth now being called for at the opening out stage. We conclude 
that transport decision-making would benefit from a rebalancing of technical depth with 
analytical breadth. The paper outlines a plausible new approach to opening out and closing 
down that is starting to be applied in practice. This approach must be accompanied by an 
opening up of the processes by which technical advice for decisions are reached and how 
uncertainties are understood and negotiated.
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Introduction
An uncomfortable position
The latest in a series of road traffic forecasts from the UK Government that stretches back 
nearly half a century carries an acknowledgement that “[w]hile uncertainty in road traf-
fic demand has always existed, it is perhaps now more uncertain than ever” (DfT 2018a: 
27). This echoes what the National Infrastructure Commission sees as “the high levels of 
uncertainty which surround the decisions that need to be taken over the next thirty years” 
to address Britain’s infrastructure needs out to 2050 (NIC 2017: 34).
This paper is motivated by a need to respond to what appears to be a new era for trans-
port planning in which deep uncertainty must be accounted for when informing decision 
making and investment. As the French philosopher Voltaire remarked some three centuries 
ago, “uncertainty is an uncomfortable position but certainty is an absurd one”. There is a 
need to make sense of the uncertainty faced and consider how it can be accommodated in 
a way that is appropriate both in terms of analytical rigour and ease of communication, 
thereby supporting rather than paralysing decision making.
A wicked problem
Determinants of uncertainty for the transport sector are multifaceted and include the: 
changing demand for travel in society, its causes and likely continuation (Marsden et al. 
2018; Maltha et  al. 2017); impacts of climate change on infrastructure resilience and 
investment needs (Buurman and Babovic 2016; Dawson et al. 2016); speed and nature of 
any transition away from fossil fuel powered transport (Contestabile et  al. 2017; Brand 
et al. 2019); future way in which road travel will be priced in a shift to electric vehicles 
(NIC 2017; Volterra Partners and Jacobs 2017); digital age maturing with a myriad of 
developments in information and communications technology (ICT) that in turn influence 
behaviours (Lyons et  al. 2018a); advent, deployment and impacts of increasingly intelli-
gent, automated and connected vehicle technology (Shaheen et al. 2018; Rohr et al. 2015); 
and the traditional factors of population growth, fuel price, disposable income and land-use 
distribution (NIC 2016; OBR 2018).
Each of these determinants of uncertainty are subject to divergence of opinion (and 
underlying values) amongst experts and stakeholders. They face a lack of empirical evi-
dence and insight. This can make way for speculation. They are each complex and yet also 
have complex interactions with each other. In short, it can be said that handling uncertainty 
constitutes a wicked problem (Head 2010; Rittel and Webber 1973) which may explain the 
accompanying discomfort.
A challenge to the forecast‑led transport planning paradigm
Uncertainty in strategic planning is not a new phenomenon. Marchau et al. find that the 
way “uncertainties are handled is strongly related to assumptions one has about the future” 
(Marchau et al. 2010: 940). Where uncertainty is seen to be limited, or the dimensions of 
uncertainty are perceived to be understood, then a trend-based, forecast-led approach can 
be deemed to be a reasonable way of representing uncertainty (Wilkinson 2009). How-
ever, it is argued that trend-based approaches cannot deal with “processes of social trans-
formation” (Byrne 2003: 176) in which the functional relationships are subject to change 
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and where it is no longer possible to assign probabilities to future outcomes (Walker et al. 
2010).
It is this paper’s premise that deep uncertainty is being faced. This brings with it a need 
to reflect upon and, we believe, revise how it is handled. We suggest that recent develop-
ments point towards a transition taking place in society away from the current regime of 
automobility (the motor age) towards a new regime as yet to be defined (but born of the 
motor age and digital age colliding and merging) (Geels et al. 2012; Lyons 2015). Such a 
transition could take decades to unfold but would undoubtedly impact on the case for many 
current investment plans which are evaluated on the trade-off of benefits and costs over 
periods of between 30 and 60 years into the future.
Of the different approaches to dealing with uncertainty beyond forecasting (as depicted 
above), scenario planning is perhaps the best recognised. Its genesis dates back to the 1940s 
and it began being embraced to great effect by Shell in the 1960s and 1970s (Chermack 
et al. 2001). Van der Heijden (2000, p 32) describes scenario planning as starting “from the 
premise that if the future is uncertain there are, in fact, multiple equally plausible futures, 
which we call scenarios”. Whilst there have been several examples of scenario planning 
exercises in transport planning (e.g. OST 2006; Banister and Hickman 2013; Zmud et al. 
2013; Lyons and Davidson 2016), the process typically remains curiously upstream of, 
and separate from, the process of strategy and scheme development and appraisal, wherein 
a reliance on forecasting continues to prevail. Meanwhile, it has been suggested that the 
orthodox approach to transport scheme assessment has become so highly codified in the 
forecasting tradition that it becomes institutionally very difficult to change (Hall 1993; 
Marsden and McDonald 2019).
In summarising this paper’s introduction so far it can be said that we are in uncomfort-
able territory in which the transport sector is subject to winds of uncertain change. There 
is a need for appropriate means to be able to chart a robust course forwards which may run 
counter to the orthodox wisdom and practice.
A case‑study approach
The paper explores the treatment of uncertainty through an examination of the changing 
approach to decision-making in England. Whilst the paper draws on literature from across 
the planning domain, it relates this throughout to: (1) the codified decision-making pro-
cesses of the UK Government as manifested in the Treasury Green Book (HM Treasury 
2003); and (2) Department for Transport forecasting and appraisal documents from the past 
three decades. The choice of case study results from the ability to examine how these issues 
have evolved over time and because of the clear documented guidance regarding how and 
where to treat uncertainty in decision-making. The approach adopted in the UK will be of 
wider interest as it is recognised as one which fits with the mainstream texts and guidance 
which circulate the world of practice internationally (Mackie et al. 2005; OECD 2011).
There are three main sections to the paper. The first addresses how uncertainty has been 
recognised and treated in the initial stages of setting the context for scheme design and 
evaluation. This process or these processes form part of what we refer to as opening out the 
set of plausible futures. The second section examines how alternative futures are then inter-
preted in informing and taking decisions. As Rydin (2007) notes, as well as opening out 
what is in scope there always has to be some way of closing down towards what is mean-
ingful, or relevant or even reasonable to consider given the scale or nature of the decision 
being taken. The final section discusses the need to move beyond existing highly developed 
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decision-making approaches to overcome the tensions of opening out and closing down. To 
do so, we suggest requires a re-examination of what knowledge is valued and where it is 
valued and accounted for in the decision-support process. This calls for an opening up of 
the decision-making process to reflect the new environment in which decisions are being 
taken. The paper outlines a plausible new approach to opening out and closing down that is 
starting to be applied in practice.
The paper is written both for those engaged in the detail of forecasting and assessment 
and those who use, or debate the implications of, such approaches. Whilst we use the detail 
of practice in England we try to limit the depth to that necessary to understand the impor-
tant generalizable messages. We set out pointers to guidance for those wanting more detail.
Opening out
In this section we address practice to date in opening out uncertainty—namely embracing 
the extent of uncertainty faced. We describe the approach to considering uncertainty in the 
current forecast-led paradigm. Road traffic forecasts in Great Britain are used as our case 
study. Road traffic forms over 80% of passenger kilometres travelled in Britain (DfT 2018b) 
and has been the subject of frequent and transparently documented forecasting exercises 
since the 1970s. This allows for the treatment of uncertainty over time to be followed.
Overview of the road traffic forecasting approach
Reports of official road traffic forecasts (vehicle distance travelled) have been produced 
by the UK Government in (at least) the following years: 1969, 1973, 1975, 1980, 1984, 
1989, 1997, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2018. This section of the paper is 
based upon our review of the reports from 1989 onwards to which we have access. The 
UK’s Department for Transport (DfT) has evolved the National Transport Model (NTM) 
to produce the forecasts (DfT 2018a). The NTM is described as providing: “a systematic 
means of comparing the national consequences of alternative national transport policies or 
widely-applied local transport policies, against a range of background scenarios which take 
into account the major factors affecting future patterns of travel” (DfT 2010). The forecasts 
produced have provided one of the most significant reference points for informing and jus-
tifying policy and investment decisions in transport at a national and (with further detailed 
modelling) a more localised level.
Each of the sets of national road traffic forecasts (NRTF) is largely common in terms 
of the following. Three key inputs are considered to have the principal influence on out-
put traffic—population (i.e. the number of tripmakers), income (GDP per capita in par-
ticular—i.e. the level of financial resource at the disposal of the tripmaker) and fuel price 
(i.e. a proxy for the unit cost of travel by road faced by the tripmaker). A base year in the 
recent past is taken as an empirical reference point from which to then forecast traffic some 
20–35 years forwards.
The modelling accounts for publicly confirmed policies and investments (a point of rel-
evance returned to later) in the transport system (typically affecting capacity) that play out 
through the forecast period. It is recognised that the key inputs each have uncertainty of 
their own and ‘high’ and ‘low’ compounded variation in the inputs [e.g. high population 
growth, high income growth and low fuel price (DfT 2013)] has been used as a form of 
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sensitivity test to determine the effect on future traffic forecasts. The resulting range can be 
referred to as a ‘forecast fan’.
Modification of the approach
Sensitivity testing up to and including the 2013 NRTF was around a ‘central’ forecast. 
While a forecast fan could be seen to depict uncertainty, there was an implied and indeed 
sometimes stated understanding that the central projection was more likely to come to frui-
tion than forecasts towards the outer reaches of the fan. Given that the central estimates of 
traffic levels have in practice never been closest to the outturn levels (Goodwin 2012) it is 
perhaps surprising that in most NRTF exercises the use of sensitivity tests has been predi-
cated around the idea of a single most likely scenario with other combinations seen to be 
“highly unlikely” or “less likely”.
The 2015 and 2018 NRTF are each significant in that they represent a departure from 
this. The 2015 NRTF report made no reference to a central road traffic forecast. Instead 
it claimed to “employ a scenario approach to attempt to capture more of the uncertainty” 
(DfT 2015: 5). In a departure from only considering compound variations in the popula-
tion, income and fuel price inputs, new ‘scenarios’ also considered: (1) continuation of 
the ongoing decline in trip rates seen in recent years (rather than using a historic average); 
and (2) a break in the relationship between income and travel. The 2018 NRTF exercise 
has gone on to consider “a wider variety of uncertainty and combining multiple issues to 
create plausible future states of the world” (DfT 2018a: 6). This has included, in relation 
to technological change, an attempt for the first time to account for future effects of elec-
tric vehicle take-up. An attempt is also made to address autonomous vehicles but this is 
done separately to the main set of scenarios and is carefully portrayed in terms of possible 
(exploratory) scenarios rather than plausible scenarios. We return to the handling of tech-
nological change below.
These most recent NRTF exercises reflect an attempt, both in the reporting narratives 
and in the modelled scenarios, to give greater prominence to uncertainty.1 This then raises 
the question of whether, in turn, the forecast fans reflect this?
Comparing forecast ranges across NRTF reports
Table 1 summarises across the NRTF reports from 1989 to 2018 how what we refer to as 
the degree of forecast fan has changed over time. This could be considered a measure of 
opening out. Across the 30 years of forecasting exercises, total road traffic (vehicle distance 
travelled) has never been forecast to decline (although the 2018 NRTF mid-range rate of 
growth is the lowest it has been—less than a third of that forecast in 1989). From 1989 
to 2011 the degree of forecast fan has got smaller which could imply a growing degree of 
certainty about the future. This is followed by a sharp increase in the degree of forecast fan 
in 2013 suggesting a return of greater uncertainty. Given the move (as explained above) to 
‘capture more uncertainty’ in 2015 and then in turn to consider ‘a wider variety of uncer-
tainty’ in 2018, it might have been expected that the degree of forecast fan would have 
continued to increase, yet it has done the reverse.
1 Indeed it is perhaps worth noting that the average incidence per report page of reference to ‘uncertain’ is 
twice as high in NRTF 2018 as it is in NRTF 2015.
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This may be explained in part by the influence of population forecasts. Across the NRTF 
reports, population is consistently acknowledged as a key driver of traffic growth. The 2018 
report notes “how variable ONS population projections have been over the past 50 years 
… an indication of the uncertainty surrounding population” (DfT 2018a: 35). It may there-
fore appear surprising that population uncertainty has not been accounted for in sensitiv-
ity analysis in all the reports. This is only evidently the case for the 2008, 2013 and 2018 
reports (see Table  2). Table  2 indicates the population forecasts used in the NRTF over 
time. It also compares the forecast rate of population change and shows the extent of the 
range of this rate for 2013 and 2018. How, then, is population treated across the three most 
recent road traffic forecast exercises such that it might help explain the change in opening 
out represented in Table 1?:
• 2013 forecasts—the scenarios at the edges of the forecast fan were ‘low popula-
tion + low GDP + high oil price’ and ‘high population + high GDP + low oil price’. Pop-
ulation uncertainty thus played a ‘full’ part in influencing the forecast fan (contrary to 
the previous reports2).
• 2015 forecasts—no uncertainty in population was considered in the set of scenarios 
forming the forecast fan.
• 2018 forecasts—uncertainty in population is considered through two scenarios but not 
in combination with uncertainty in GDP and oil price as it was in the 2013 exercise. 
These two scenarios do not define the high and the low end of the forecast fan as they 
did in 2013. These instead are defined by: (1) a scenario that considers ongoing decline 
in trip rate along with ongoing decline in young people’s driving licence holding; and 
(2) a scenario that considers a strong shift to zero emission vehicles (see further below). 
Table 2  Comparison of population forecasts over time used in road traffic forecasting
a Example calculation of rate of population change
1989 population change = 4.9; 1989 forecast period = 37 (1988–2025)
2018 population change = 19; 2018 forecast period = 35 (2015–2050)
2018 rate of population change = (19/35)/(4.9/37) * 100  = 410
Report year Forecast population change 
(%)
Rate of population  changea (population change/forecast 
period)-base 1989 = 100
1989 4.9 100
1997 3.3 71
2007 8.5 292
2008 14.5 (+ low migration) 498
2009 21 496
2011 18 544
2013 20 (low 10; high 30) 503
2015 19 478
2018 19 (low 13; high 24) 410
2 Going further back to the 1997 and 1989 exercises that did not consider population uncertainty yet which 
each have a degree of forecast fan comparable to that of 2013, we infer that uncertainties in fuel price and 
GDP were playing a bigger part than has been the case more recently.
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Neither of these scenarios consider, as far as we are aware, compound effects of popula-
tion uncertainty (high/low migration).
It is also important to note that the NRTF make use of population forecasts provided 
by the Office for National Statistics. Road traffic forecast sensitivity analysis or scenarios 
relating to population must be consistent with the ONS population forecasts. As such, the 
judgement on the treatment of population uncertainty is, in part, ‘upstream’ of the NRTF 
process.
From our consideration so far of the approach that is taken to opening out in UK road 
traffic forecasting, the following is apparent. For each NRTF exercise, how and to what 
extent uncertainty over input drivers of road traffic is accounted for is a matter of judge-
ment. Judgement determines which scenarios comprise the set considered in a given fore-
casting exercise and in turn influence the forecast fan. The scope of the uncertainty is 
bounded by institutional decisions about which uncertainties are allowed into a particular 
forecasting exercise both individually and in combination (given the structure of the model 
on which the forecasts are based). A critique of the reasoned selection of input variables is 
not new (De Jong et al. 2007; Goodwin 2012), other than to note that the inclusion, exclu-
sion or approach to selecting the range of variables has not been systematic.
We cannot really be sure, therefore, that the forecast fan has been widening or narrow-
ing from one exercise to the next on the basis of variation in traditional input variables or 
on the basis of different assumptions about the treatment of those variables in the sensitiv-
ity analysis or selection of scenarios to include. In turn, it is not transparent as to whether 
any adjustments over time are due to a changing world view about the likelihood of some 
outturns or due to the politics or practicalities of the day (e.g. aligning with, or not prejudg-
ing, forecasts which come from elsewhere across government). What can be said is that 
even with the inclusion of new assumptions about varying trip rates and a recognised need 
to attempt to represent the implications of electric and autonomous vehicles, the degree of 
forecast fan is not as great in 2018 as it was back in 1989 when these uncertainties were not 
on the agenda.
Reaching beyond the traditional drivers of road traffic
The approach in NRTF 2015 and 2018 of accounting for trip rate uncertainty marks an 
acknowledgment of the importance, in embracing future uncertainty, of changes to the 
mobility system and the changing nature of how people travel. The introduction, for exam-
ple, of a scenario with continued declining trip rates in NRTF 2015 produces an outturn 
forecast with 70bn fewer vehicle miles driven per year by 2040 than if the decline in trip 
rates is assumed to have stopped (22% lower growth). This variation is only slightly less 
than the difference between high GDP/low oil price and low GDP/high oil price scenarios 
(25% difference in growth) which would traditionally be considered. The observed trend in 
trip rate decline, whilst not fully understood, is attributable to a mix of non-transport fac-
tors and changing transport policies over the past two decades (Marsden et al. 2018; Chat-
terjee et al. 2018; Le Vine et al. 2017). It is neither unclear to us why social change of this 
nature would feature in just one scenario nor why it would be treated as entirely independ-
ent of other changes such as travel costs and disposable income.
The NRTF 2018 exercise, in attempting to reach further beyond traditional drivers of 
road traffic and embrace technological change, exposes the challenge of doing so. The UK 
government has made a public commitment to “end the sale of new conventional petrol 
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and diesel cars and vans by 2040” and “for all new cars and vans to be effectively zero 
emission by 2040” (DfT 2018c: 7). While hybrid cars (powered by electricity and petrol 
or diesel) are to be exempt, this signals a strong move towards zero emission vehicles. The 
government has likewise made clear its commitment to the development and deployment 
of driverless vehicles. To have not accounted for such change in NRTF 2018 would have 
been conspicuous by its absence. Yet the challenge of doing so is apparent. With regard to 
connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs), NRTF 2018 stopped short of offering road traffic 
forecasts accounting for them. It instead offered some accompanying exploratory analysis 
in which the aim was to consider which aspects of CAVs road traffic forecasts would be 
sensitive to. With reference to possible scenarios (rather than the plausible scenarios of the 
main NRTF exercise) it was found that modelled traffic growth was particularly sensitive to 
vehicle occupancy levels.
Turning to electrification, all but one of the plausible scenarios (leading to the forecast 
fan) take current committed policy to equate to a 25% fleet penetration by 2050 in the 
scenarios’ modelling. The assumption is that current taxation and uptake incentives would 
only lead to a 25% uptake, despite a policy goal of all new vehicles being zero emission 
by 2040. The ‘shift to zero emission vehicles’ scenario aligned to the 2040 commitment 
assumes 97% of car and LGV mileage is powered by zero emission technologies by 2050. 
This scenario results in the highest forecast of traffic growth. Allied to this, the report notes 
that “[t]here are no assumed changes to government policy (e.g. tax changes on electric-
ity)” (DfT 2018a: 42). This is, of course, a mirage. In a scenario where only 25% of vehi-
cles are electric then the basis for paying for transport, largely through fuel duty, remains 
fairly robust. By contrast, a future state with 97% of mileage as electric, and therefore 
almost no fuel duty, represents a foundational shift in policy on paying for travel. It is hard 
to reconcile this with “no assumed changes to government policy”. This assumption is cen-
tral to this scenario producing the highest forecast of traffic growth. It serves to highlight 
how judgements concerning how scenarios are selected and represented in the NTM can 
not only affect the degree of forecast fan but also the overall orientation of the fan upwards 
or downwards.
When is opening out sufficient?
We find it surprising, given the range of uncertainties which could now be considered in 
future forecasts, that we see a narrowing in the range of future anticipated growth trajec-
tories. Our reflections above suggest that whilst there is a willingness to look at how to 
accommodate new and emerging trends in behaviour and technological innovation, this 
starts from a position where they have to be adopted as some kind of variant of the exist-
ing approach to thinking about growth. When incorporating electric vehicles and automa-
tion (independently), this has proven difficult. If change is disruptive to how and why we 
travel then this will indeed prove difficult to accommodate within the current tools and 
the bounds of judgement that are applied with their use. With an assumption that such 
accommodation is important, one approach would be to press for a continuation in, and 
redoubled effort concerning, the evolution of those bounds of judgement in how scenarios 
are selected, represented in the NTM and then reported on. Another approach would be 
to consider alternative or complementary futuring tools that offer new scope for assessing 
deep uncertainty.
However, we should not assume that other approaches to opening out will neces-
sarily result in better decision making support. In a recent exercise, the UK Airports 
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Commission’s consideration of future aviation demand attempted to deal with more plu-
ralistic futures. It incorporated both variations in historic ‘drivers of demand’ but also sce-
narios of how the aviation market might develop to inform its analysis of runway develop-
ment options (ITF, Thompson and Jamotta 2015). However, the review of the scenarios 
approach (ibid.: 20) concluded that the exercise was “unnecessarily complicated and the 
impacts difficult to untangle” and that it “resulted in a large volume of analysis that is dif-
ficult to absorb”.
It is apparent that opening out uncertainty and its communication to decision makers 
risks cognitive overload. The proposed solution in the exercise above was “to focus analysis 
on a single scenario” which was the initial trend based forecast model which was deemed 
to be “central” and “most likely” and against which other “less likely” positions might be 
assessed. In short, having developed scenarios which opened out uncertainty there was no 
clear process for subsequently dealing with this complexity. In the following section we ask 
whether a similar problem of how to deal with multiple futures might exist in the forecast-
ing led approach.
Closing down
As already mentioned in the Introduction, Rydin (2007: 58) notes that, as well as opening 
out what is in scope for a decision, there always has to be some way of “closing down” 
towards what is meaningful, or relevant or even reasonable to consider given the scale or 
nature of the decision being taken. In other words, within the resources available for trans-
port analysis, uncertainty has to be negotiated in such a way that courses of policy and 
investment can still be identified and appraised. We refer to closing down as the process 
of narrowing the plurality of futures for the purposes of informing targeted policymaking 
action. How closing down is done, as the Airports Commission review suggests, strongly 
bounds what uncertainties actually matter in decision-making and the extent to which deci-
sion making accommodates rather than conceals uncertainty. As with opening out, there is 
a need to be alert to the conscious and unconscious biases at play.
A disconnect between opening out and closing down
As noted above, the 2015 and 2018 NRTF exercises have abandoned the notion of a central 
projection or ‘most likely’ future. In our view this is a potentially highly significant step in 
terms of what it signals.3 While the degree of forecast fan in each case is smaller than that 
for the 2013 NRTF, the ranges of plausible total road traffic growth remain substantial: 
19–55% from 2010 to 2040 for NRTF 2015 and 17–51% from 2015 to 2050 for NRTF 2018 
(see Table 1). Such ranges should present a challenge to the requirements of overarching 
government appraisal which is to conduct a proportionate assessment of risks, uncertain-
ties and inherent biases (HM Treasury 2003). However, the DfT’s transport appraisal guid-
ance for considering policy options and transport schemes is—perhaps surprisingly—not 
yet directly related to the NRTF representation of plausible futures. A separate process of 
3 This said, scenario 1 in NRTF 2018—which assumes central projections for population, GDP and fuel 
price—is referred to as the ‘reference scenario’ and is the middle scenario in terms of levels of forecast traf-
fic growth across the seven scenarios considered.
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closing down uncertainty is applied as described below—and was still the case at the time 
of NRTF 2018 in spite of the change in approach to forecast scenarios in 2015.4
In addressing a specific scheme appraisal, DfT guidance requires the modelling of a 
core scenario that is based on central projection data from the National Trip End Model 
(NTEM) that forms part of the NTM. This central projection corresponds, in the case of 
the 2015 NRTF, to something very close to that report’s Scenario 1 (which assumes central 
macroeconomic estimates). Thus while not referred to as a core scenario in the 2015 set of 
NRTFs, it is taken as such for specific scheme appraisal.
DfT guidance on addressing forecasting and uncertainty in specific scheme appraisal 
(DfT 2018d) is detailed and full coverage is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in 
relation to handling uncertainty around the required core scenario it has the following to 
say. “Most models will not be able to reflect, explicitly and fully, the uncertainty of national 
trends such as GDP growth, fuel price trends and vehicle efficiency changes as they will be 
relying on the national models underlying NTEM. Therefore it is best to test the impact of 
this uncertainty by using high and low growth scenarios instead.” (DfT 2018d: 7, emphasis 
added). A procedure for establishing high and low growth assumptions is then stipulated. 
This is based on adding or subtracting a proportion of base year demand to the demand for 
the core scenario.5
Fig. 1  High and low uncertainty boundaries with mid-range NRTF 2018 scenario taken as most likely
4 This reflects an acknowledged lag between changes to approaches in NTM forecasting exercises and 
updates to transport appraisal guidance (TAG—https ://www.gov.uk/guida nce/trans port-analy sis-guida nce-
webta g).
5 The amount of adjustment changes over the forecast period with the square root of the number of years 
out from the base year multiplied by a factor p, which for roads is 2.5 per cent. We note here that the advice 
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Figure 1 shows the seven scenarios from the latest NRTF 2018 alongside the upper and 
lower sensitivity test bands from the reference scenario that would correspond to the spe-
cific scheme appraisal guidance above on using high and low growth scenarios to test the 
impact of uncertainty.
The fan of uncertainty implied by the procedure for defining high and low tests (indi-
cated by the shaded area) comfortably incorporates five of the scenarios (those relating to 
different assumptions on economic growth and fuel price as well as high and low popula-
tion migration). Moving across the period out to 2050, two scenarios (Scenarios 6 and 7) 
are seen to reach and move beyond the two bounds of the test range. The transport appraisal 
guidance states that “[t]he core scenario will form the basis for the analysis reported in the 
Appraisal Summary Table (AST) and, as such, should represent the best basis for decision-
making given current evidence” (DfT 2018c: 5, emphasis added). As such, scenarios 6 and 
7 would be seen as test extremes. They have gone from: (1) being part of a set of plausi-
ble scenarios in the opening out of uncertainty portrayed in the national forecasts; to (2) 
being extreme and indeed out of bounds scenarios in the closing down process for scheme 
appraisal. This is in spite of the NRTF 2018 report stating that “[a]ll 7 scenarios are con-
sidered to represent plausible futures and thus all scenarios should be taken into account 
when using the forecast results” (DfT 2018a: 84, footnote 60).
Fig. 2  High and low uncertainty boundaries with extrapolated trip reduction NRTF 2018 scenario taken as 
most likely
Footnote 5 (continued)
is for scheme appraisal. For illustrative purposes we apply the approach to the national forecasts to demon-
strate what the simple assumptions at a scheme level equate to at a national scale.
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It could perhaps be argued that the range of the uncertainty test largely covers the set of 
demand scenarios and the major differences occur towards the end of the assessment period, 
which would in any case be heavily discounted in any appraisal and so less likely to impact 
on the value for money of decisions. However, that is to overlook the impacts of the choice of 
scenario around which to assess high and low uncertainty. We now turn to this.
Figure 2 shows the same seven scenarios but this time displays the fan of high and low 
uncertainty which exists if another scenario from the set of plausible NRTF 2018 scenarios—
scenario 6 (where the recently observed decline in trip rates is extrapolated into the future)—is 
taken as the core scenario for scheme appraisal. Here, the lower bound demand uncertainty 
test would mean schemes would need to be robust to appraisal in a world with almost zero 
traffic growth. The upper bound on uncertainty falls beneath four of the other scenarios for 
between 20 and 35 years of the assessment period. The choice of which scenario is used to 
bound assessment of uncertainty, amongst a set of (equally) plausible options, matters hugely 
to what levels of demand are considered in closing down and which scenarios are included or 
excluded as a result of that.
A regressive approach to scheme appraisal?
In closing down, the logic of no one scenario expressly being more likely than another (estab-
lished in opening out) is lost. There are parallels with the experience of the Airports Com-
mission. Closing down appears to be done in ways which reduce cognitive overload from the 
presentation of too many future scenarios. It seems difficult to move away from a cognitive 
bias for establishing some form of reference scenario which is deemed “most likely” in order 
to make the assessment and presentation of such an assessment manageable. Our work sug-
gests that the assumptions allowed for, or expected, in closing down within the forecasting 
paradigm can very significantly influence the bounds within which the assessment by decision 
makers is focused.
In a scenarios-based approach, the plausibility of different future relationships between 
how we participate in society and how much related travel is involved can emerge. In a fore-
casting-based approach those changes to society are more confined—to those which the mod-
elling tool (which was not built with such a need in mind) is able to include. In picking a 
single scenario within that we further close down to one set of assumptions about how past 
behaviour will project forward, thus undermining the principles of a scenarios approach (van 
Dorsser et al. 2018).
It seems the position remains uncomfortable if not indeed unsatisfactory. While efforts are 
being made within the forecasting paradigm to improve opening out, limitations remain; and 
the inconsistency between opening out and in turn closing down needs addressing to avoid 
the risk of closing down amounting to shutting down (concealing some of the acknowledged 
uncertainty revealed by opening up). In the last section of the paper we therefore move to con-
sider recent insights that have been elicited from engagement with other transport profession-
als and in particular those giving their attention to the handling of uncertainty.
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Opening up
Time for change
In June 2018 the UK Department for Transport published a new Appraisal and Modelling 
Strategy (DfT 2018e) for consultation. Recognising changes in travel behaviour combined 
with technological developments as key sources of uncertainty, the Strategy points to a 
need for “better tools to capture and communicate uncertainty to decision makers, includ-
ing the development and use of scenarios” (ibid: 8). A number of means of accounting for 
uncertainty are identified, including: sensitivity testing; switching values (how much an 
input value to forecasting would need to change before the value for money category of a 
scheme in the appraisal process would be affected); Monte Carlo analysis (that entails its 
own assumptions to be aware of); and scenario testing (whereby a scheme’s performance in 
different plausible future contexts can be considered).
This section of the paper summarises our thoughts on next steps for practice and 
research in tackling these challenges. We draw on a roundtable held in Summer 2018, 
organised as part of the process of developing this paper, involving a number of key indi-
viduals engaged in strategic planning, appraisal and the handling of uncertainty in UK 
practice (for full details see Lyons 2018).
Policy challenges and professional appetite
The issues this paper has sought to tackle concern the very real set of questions facing 
decision-makers today, regarding how best to chart a pathway through major societal and 
technological change whilst achieving challenging climate change goals and more inclu-
sive economic growth. This means finding ways to understand the new options and poten-
tial outcomes in ways which decision-makers can process and which stand up to scrutiny 
(in public inquiries, in legislative expenditure committees and in the eyes of electorates).
Are there plausible futures that could represent transformative change for society and 
transport? If so, does this not demand that we reflect accordingly upon the efficacy of our 
approach to informing  policy and investment? Is there professional appetite to change 
approach?
In a recent national initiative by the Chartered Institution of Highways & Transportation 
(Lyons 2016), over 200 UK transport professionals engaged in a series of day-long work-
shops in which their views on uncertainty and on how it is handled were explored and dis-
cussed. Participants were presented with four plausible scenarios from a scenario planning 
exercise considering uncertain future demand for car travel. There was greater collective 
belief in the plausibility of a future scenario showing a substantial decline in total car traf-
fic (vehicle distance travelled) than in the scenario depicting growth in car traffic similar to 
that falling comfortably within the forecast fans from NRTF 2015 and 2018. Such profes-
sional opinion is incongruous with the results of the current forecasting paradigm even 
accounting for its latest efforts to evolve. These professionals also collectively signalled 
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support for moving towards a policy making approach in which uncertainty is more 
strongly embraced than through further development of sensitivity approaches around a 
preferred or reference scenario.6
A plausible new approach
If the argument to move towards accounting for more ‘pluralistic’ futures as a basis for 
informing decision making is accepted then there is a substantial challenge regarding how 
to avoid the ‘out of bounds’ dismissal of plausible scenarios (illustrated by the NRTF case 
study above) and the overload problem for decision makers of taking greater account of 
uncertainty (highlighted by the case of the Airports Commission).
Prompted by Lyons and Davidson (2016), an approach has been progressed for address-
ing this challenge—one that may be especially well suited to the early strategic planning 
and optioneering stages of the policymaking and appraisal process. It has recently been 
developed and applied by Transport Scotland as part of the process of revising its National 
Transport Strategy (Lyons et al. 2018b).7
Set against a wish to fulfil a high level vision, the aim is to consider the implications of 
different courses of policy action in the face of multiple plausible futures. Does a course 
of policy action align with the vision in terms of its influence in each plausible future con-
sidered or does it align well in some and not in others? The intention is to reconcile risk 
and yield in the decision making process. As such, the approach could be considered as a 
modified form of ‘Robust Decision-Making’ (Lempert et al. 2006; Weaver et al. 2012).8 
The best course of policy action for one assumed future may give high yield in relation to 
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Fig. 3  Opening out and closing down (based on Lyons et al. 2018b)
6 See Lyons and Davidson (2016) for discussion of vision-led regime testing approaches versus regime 
compliant approaches.
7 It is now also embodied in a ‘six-stage vision-led approach to strategic planning for an uncertain world’ 
developed by the University of the West of England and Mott MacDonald called FUTURES—see www.
mottm ac.com/futur es.
8 It should be noted that the Robust Decision Making approach put forward by Lempert and colleagues is 
quantitatively-focused and involves modelling a large number (potentially many thousands) of scenarios. 
The approach discussed in this paper is distinctly different. It favours a smaller number of scenarios that can 
be addressed both quantitatively and qualitatively (in narrative form) so as to be able to inform and facilitate 
dialogue amongst stakeholders regarding the robustness of different options being considered as part of a 
strategy.
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the vision but may also carry a high risk of misalignment or even failure in other plausi-
ble futures. Meanwhile, a course of action which has reasonable alignment across multiple 
futures in terms of pursuit of the vision may offer a lower (but acceptable) yield but with 
lower risk.
Figure 3 illustrates the Transport Scotland approach referred to above and in a manner 
that seeks to address communication of uncertainty into the policymaking process without 
causing cognitive overload.
Plausible future scenarios in Fig.  3 reflect different consequences from a set of input 
drivers according to how those drivers are assumed to play out in future. This is equiva-
lent to the approach in NRTF 2018 of having a set of plausible scenarios. These could be 
viewed in appraisal terms as multiple reference ‘do-nothing’ or ‘do-minimum’ scenarios 
before candidate new policy options are introduced (as distinct from orthodox practice in 
the forecasting paradigm where only a single reference scenario is commonly considered). 
A candidate new policy (do-something) can then be tested by modelling its influence, in 
each scenario, on the set of input drivers and in turn on the outcome consequences. A Red/
Amber/Green assessment is made of how well aligned a policy and its outcome is with the 
desired future state (vision).
In the Fig.  3 illustration, policy option A shows good alignment with addressing the 
vision in the face of uncertainty—an indication of reasonable yield and low risk. Mean-
while policy options B and C suggest poor alignment and yield prospects and high risk. 
Policy option D indicates good alignment and potentially reasonable yield but with a signal 
of risk of poor yield or policy failure in relation to scenario 7. Such a matrix is the prod-
uct of a relatively simple (and therefore agile) modelling tool allied to, and enabling of, 
dialogue amongst the actors in the policymaking process. Recognition of the tool’s func-
tion as one of enabling and informing the handling of uncertainty rather than resolving the 
uncertainty is foundational to the approach.
Proportionality is an important analytical consideration, with value to be found in a 
breadth of examination of policy options within the uncertainty space rather than being 
drawn prematurely to a narrower in-depth examination of (perhaps fewer) options in the 
context of fewer do-nothing scenarios (or even only one scenario).
Changing norms
Can this approach be made to work as part of the decision making process? The answer 
may well rest upon whether or not it is possible to challenge and change the norms of what 
constitutes acceptable or proportionate analytical robustness and being able to communi-
cate analysis clearly. Particularly at the earlier stages in the policymaking process, sim-
pler (though not to infer less robust) analytical tools could be more effective in exploring 
the uncertainty space of plausible futures and enabling dialogue and development of views 
of actors in the process. Existing, more resource intensive, modelling tools may be better 
deployed to look at specific scenarios in more detail further down the line. There is also a 
need to recognise the place of both ‘narrative’ and ‘numbers’ in order to ensure effective 
engagement with actors and to communicate the credibility of, and insights from, scenarios 
analysis.
This approach (or approaches similar to it) involves a significant role for the human 
actors in the policymaking process engaging with deep uncertainty. As we have noted 
earlier, handling uncertainty is a wicked problem. In the face of a paucity of evidence 
concerning a number of interacting and complex territories of societal, technological 
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and behavioural change, there is also likely to be a divergence of views amongst actors 
themselves.
One of the challenges here is in judging whether the true extent of uncertainty is being 
accounted for, distinguishing between probable (likely to happen), plausible (could hap-
pen) and possible (might happen) futures. Views are subjective (and further coloured by 
opinion on preferable (desirable) futures). Making use of the analytical tools at their dis-
posal, it is nevertheless critical that actors in the process open-mindedly and collabora-
tively consider plausible and potentially very different social futures in a way that reflects 
well the uncertainty space (avoiding prematurely closing down the columns in Fig.  3). 
This requires a different approach to closing down decision-making (see van Dorsser et al. 
2018). Likewise an open-mindedness is called for in considering policy options (avoiding 
prematurely closing down the rows in Fig. 3). Used appropriately there is the prospect of a 
new or revised transport planning paradigm emerging.
Confronting inertia
Well-established approaches, procedures and norms can conspire against developing and 
adopting new approaches that may be better able to handle uncertainty but which are unfa-
miliar and potentially challenging to communicate. Acknowledging uncertainty can have 
connotations of poor confidence and conviction in decisions being made—for example in 
the context of public inquiries. Professional opinion in the UK appears divided, for exam-
ple, regarding whether or not ongoing use of a central projection and core scenario in 
scheme appraisal (as currently advised by appraisal guidance) is appropriate. The argu-
ments against are reflected in this paper. An argument in favour is that it offers a common 
point of reference for scheme appraisal—both between schemes and in terms of those sup-
porting or opposing a given scheme.
While there may be recognition of the need to evolve how uncertainty is handled, there 
is inertia within the forecasting paradigm to be overcome (Marsden and McDonald 2019). 
Inertia is compounded by depleted (public sector) resources and capabilities to address 
orthodox approaches let alone to evolve such approaches or introduce new ones (NAO 
2018). Inertia must be addressed if we are to see approaches such as that being taken by 
Transport Scotland becoming normalised rather than remaining the exceptions.
One means of starting to address this would be to consider how available resources can 
be redistributed across the transport planning and decision making process alongside seek-
ing to reconsider the makeup of experts required to handle uncertainty and communicate 
it to decision makers. There is also a need for strong leadership within professional prac-
tice if individuals are to be given the mandate, agency and support to effect change. The 
application of new approaches should be strongly encouraged, with a ‘learning by doing’ 
philosophy where experiences of those new approaches and the lessons learned are shared 
with others.
Research challenges
If we are to see a paradigm shift in transport planning as regards forward planning and 
investment in the face of uncertainty, the issues such as those above need addressing. 
Research will have an important part to play as it has done in the evolution of the fore-
casting paradigm to date. There is not scope in this paper to fully explore and formulate a 
research agenda. However, we would briefly point to four further issues:
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• Understanding a changing world—Whilst we identify above that there is considera-
ble professional uncertainty about likely directions of future travel demand shifts, this 
is also a research gap (Marsden et al. 2018; Shaheen et al. 2018). The plausibility of 
different combinations of social change, transport technology change and behavioural 
adaptation (to both) is not well-understood. A deeper understanding of the extent to 
which different futures could unfold, given existing land-uses, cohort effects, technol-
ogy transition periods and evidence of pace of change to date should be developed.
• Understanding the decision makers’ perspective—It is well established that decision-
makers reduce the complexity of their tasks by focussing on significant cues (Shanteau 
1992). However, we find little evidence on what those cues are or how they relate to the 
cognitive limitations of decision-makers, particularly in the transportation assessment 
context (see Nellthorp and Mackie 2000 as an exception). Even were such limits to be 
established or understood we see no reason why step-wise approaches to decision-sup-
port could not be developed which reduced the risk in cognitive overload (see Dodgson 
et  al. 2009). Rather than presuming what decision-makers can cope with and work-
ing back from there to the current forecasting and assessment approach, this should be 
empirically and iteratively tested.
• Appropriate scrutiny of different categories of intervention—How uncertainty is han-
dled and the level of scrutiny applied may vary according to different stages in an 
appraisal process but also according to different categories of project or policy. This 
concerns proportionality, particularly in the face of limited analytical resource. It would 
be helpful to empirically examine how different categories of schemes and interven-
tions might become distinguishable and in turn guide which approach(es) would offer 
proportionate scrutiny in each category. This might differ by place (e.g. core urban 
areas versus inter-urban corridors) as well as by intervention (e.g. train electrification 
of existing lines versus constructing new lines).
• Adaptive planning—Uncertainty is not a steady-state phenomenon. While the alterna-
tive approach set out in this paper can be better suited to handling deep uncertainty than 
the forecast-led approach, it is at risk of being static in its application. In other words, 
as the world continues to evolve (in some ways potentially profoundly and rapidly) the 
knowledge we have about trends and views about the nature of future uncertainty will 
also change. A candidate policy or investment may presently be judged to strike a good 
balance between risk and yield; yet this may change. As such, there is an important role 
for ongoing monitoring and review of policies and investments. It is not clear the extent 
to which current or evolving practice is accounting for this or has the capacity to do so. 
This merits further attention (see Roelich and Giesekam 2019 and Marchau et al. 2019).
Final reflections
The paper draws in detail upon direct practitioner experience and insight from the UK and 
examines current and evolving practice. Is has demonstrated how transport authorities and 
individual professionals are alive to the need to respond to deep uncertainty and are tak-
ing steps to do so. The matters involved are non-trivial and it can be said that a mode of 
‘learning by doing’ is called for and this is being pursued, at least in the UK. Practition-
ers in other parts of the world, while implementing country-specific appraisal approaches, 
are likely to be familiar with the forecast-led approach to transport planning. The inten-
tion of this paper is to offer transferable insights from the specific UK approaches consid-
ered with a view to helping constructively challenge international approaches to transport 
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planning in the face of a changing world and thereby help ensure that the discipline evolves 
appropriately.
This article is written at a time when trust in experts has been declining. Butler (2017) 
contends that this is as a result of rising expectations that, in a technological age, the 
answers of experts will become ‘better’ as they have more analytical capability at their 
disposal. However, as we have set out, improvements in the sophistication of analytical 
techniques are not necessarily the same as developing understanding, techniques and pro-
cesses that enhance insight into what sorts of futures might unfold or what the options for 
decision-makers really mean.
Butler argues that there is a need for experts to be more reflective in their practices and 
to “avoid the temptation of relying on the method of science to be the only harbinger of 
truth and knowledge” (Butler 2017: 8). Greater transparency and accountability are sug-
gested to be important in addressing what RAND refers to as ‘truth decay’ (Kavanagh and 
Rich 2018).
Our aim, through this article, has been to demonstrate the limits of the existing approach 
to forecast-led planning. Particularly for longer-term strategic planning and major infra-
structure investment programmes, there is a need to find: (1) new ways to acknowledge and 
account for uncertainty; and (2) ways to communicate this effectively to decision-makers 
and the general public. Rather than being an admission that experts should not be trusted, 
we suggest it requires a rethinking of what attributes represent expertise and where those 
are best applied in decision-making processes. Greater understanding of how policy futures 
might unfold and of how vulnerable policy options might be to different uncertainties 
would simply be a shift in valuing different attributes of professional knowledge. Given the 
quite substantial societal change which is implied by some of the futures currently being 
envisaged, we suggest that this is a skill set which requires rapid development.
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